GitLab

I performed a static analysis of DeepSeek, a LLM chatbot, using version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to determine potential security and privacy problems.

I have actually composed about DeepSeek previously here.

Additional security and privacy concerns about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based purely on fixed analysis. This suggests that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive evidence that all of it is executed in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants analysis, particularly provided the growing issues around information privacy, surveillance, the prospective misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics in between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising issues about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app the other day also.

• Bespoke encryption and data obfuscation approaches exist, with signs that they could be used to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, instead of relying on the user device's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking catches detailed user behavior without clear authorization.
• WebView adjustment is present, which could enable the app to gain access to private external internet browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A substantial portion of the examined code appears to focus on gathering device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects numerous special gadget identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System homes, set up plans, and root detection systems suggest potential anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that privacy supporters and security researchers use to root their Android devices.
• Geolocation and network profiling exist, suggesting prospective tracking abilities and making it possible for or disabling of fingerprinting routines by region.
• Hardcoded device design lists suggest the application might behave in a different way depending upon the detected hardware.
• Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out additional gadget details. E.g. if it can not identify the device through standard Android SIM lookup (because authorization was not given), it attempts manufacturer particular extensions to access the exact same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, several observed behaviors line up with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which could help with unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, identification numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for unknown purposes.
• The app carries out country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible monitoring mechanisms.
• The app executes calls to pack Dex modules, where additional code is loaded from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves turn around and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to pack additional.so files. This facility is not normally inspected by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
• The.so files can be implemented in native code, such as C++. The use of native code includes a layer of complexity to the analysis procedure and obscures the full degree of the app's abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily intensify benefits, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities within the operating system or device hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While data collection prevails in modern-day applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises considerable personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a valid email, which must already supply enough authentication. There is no legitimate reason for the app to strongly collect and transfer distinct device identifiers, IMEI numbers, annunciogratis.net SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
  
  The level of tracking observed here exceeds common analytics practices, potentially making it possible for persistent user tracking and re-identification across devices. These habits, combined with obfuscation strategies and network interaction with third-party tracking services, warrant a higher level of analysis from security scientists and users alike.
  
  The work of runtime code filling in addition to the bundling of native code recommends that the app might permit the implementation and execution of unreviewed, from another location provided code. This is a serious possible attack vector. No proof in this report exists that from another location released code execution is being done, just that the center for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's approach to discovering rooted gadgets appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is typically justified in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material protection are critical, or in competitive video games to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear reasoning for such strict steps in an application of this nature, raising more concerns about its intent.
  
  Users and organizations considering installing DeepSeek ought to understand these prospective dangers. If this application is being used within a business or government environment, additional vetting and security controls need to be imposed before enabling its release on handled devices.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based upon fixed code evaluation and does not imply that all found functions are actively utilized. Further examination is needed for conclusive conclusions.